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Abstract: The combination of the digitalization of cultural goods and facilitated 
cross-border availability through the internet fuels a globalization process that is of-
ten said to cause a homogenization of demand across countries, in particular, for 
entertainment goods as music and movies. In the markets for music, this implies that 
the same hits and the same artists should be popular across countries and cultures. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we analyze historical voting data of the Eurovision 
Song Contest, the worldwide biggest live broadcasted international music competi-
tion between all countries of the European Broadcasting Union. It covers the period 
from 1975-2016 where digitalization and internet availability were invented and 
evolved into mass phenomena. Consequently, according to the outlined theory of 
homogenization of preferences, voting should have become more concentrated on 
the leading artists and less focused on regional differences in taste. For the purpose 
of detecting concentration trends in the points allocation, we employ different indi-
cators for measuring concentration. First, we calculate a concentration ratio, repre-
senting the accumulated total number of points of the top three, five and ten-placed 
countries in each year of the contest. Second, we calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman-
Index (HHI) and, third, the Gini-Coefficient for each year. Furthermore, we test trend-
lines for statistical significance. The results show, that our analysis cannot support 
the thesis of preference homogenization. We find no significant trend towards pref-
erence convergence. In contrast, some of the employed indicators and methods point 
towards significant, albeit weak, deconcentration trends in voting behavior for the 
contest. 
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1. Introduction 
In the modern digital online world, songs, movies, e-books, fashion and websites 
reach the recipients worldwide within few seconds. The video-sharing website 
YouTube has nearly 900 million unique visits every month (YouTube 2015, Statistic 
Brain Research Institute), people watch the same television shows (à la television 
talent contests like Pop Idol or The X Factor), wear the same cloths and eat the same 
(fast) food. In the literature, this trend of global cultural convergence across indus-
tries is also known as „McDonaldization“ (Ritzer 1993). The term does not exclusively 
focus on the fast food restaurant. It serves as a metaphor for an – alleged – effect of 
globalization that is further fueled by digitalization and the widespread availability 
of broadband internet: a convergence of tastes and lifestyles away from local tradi-
tions and towards standardized and homogenized consumption patterns worldwide.  
 
More economically phrased, the combination of the digitalization of cultural goods 
and facilitated cross-border availability through the internet fuels a globalization pro-
cess that is often said to cause a homogenizing trend on preferences, for instance, 
for entertainment goods (music, movies, etc.) but also for food, fashion and so on, 
manifesting in a homogenization of demand across countries (Esmer 2006; Jurgen-
son 2010; Ferreira & Waldfogel 2013; George & Peukert 2014). This, in turn, should 
promote market convergence: according to the cultural convergence hypothesis, the 
topsellers will be the same everywhere and international superstars and international 
superstar products will gain at the expense of local heroes. In the markets for music, 
this implies that the same superhits and the same superstar artists should be the 
favorites of the audience across countries and cultures. As such, the convergence 
process translates into a concentration process where the same group of global su-
perstars leads the market everywhere instead of a kaleidoscope of local heroes. The 
pro-concentration effect should be even stronger, if the process of digitalization and 
internet availability is accompanied by trade liberalization and economic integration.  
 
In order to test this hypothesis, we analyze voting data from the Eurovision Song 
Contest, a music competition where artists from European countries compete for 
votes from the participating countries. As the EBU Director General Ingrid Deltenre 
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puts it: “60 years ago the first Eurovision Song Contest was held with the aim of 
bringing nations together. Music knows no national boundaries and provides a com-
mon language for us all. The friendships formed between the competing artists from 
over 40 nations come through the screen to audiences watching at home. The fact 
that the Eurovision Song Contest is so popular in an increasingly polarized world 
illustrates that the differences are smaller than we think”.1 This competition has a 60 
year history, spanning from 1956 to 2016 (and ongoing). Thus, it covers the period 
in time where digitalization and internet availability were invented and evolved into 
mass phenomena. Furthermore, economic integration has significantly proceeded in 
Europe through this time period as well. Consequently, according to the outlined 
theory of homogenization of preferences and consequently demand, voting should 
have become more concentrated on the leading artists and songs in the course of 
time. Instead of national differences in preferences and taste, voters and experts 
from different European countries should have converged in their choices. This is 
highlighted by comments like the following example after the 2015 edition of the 
contest suspecting this mechanism at work: “The same problem occurred this time. 
There were a string of favorites who got all the votes. Hence, nothing was left for 
the bottom half of the ranking, the places 13 to 27. That is why we [Germany] are 
sitting on the bottom of the table. The distribution of points has just been different” 
(Urban 2015).2 In the context of the overall talk, the commentator, a long-time and 
well-respected expert of the Eurovision Song Contest, put up two hypotheses: (i) the 
voting behavior in 2015 has concentrated on the same few favorites across all coun-
tries, so that they received a larger share of the total points than usual, and (ii) this 
is an ongoing trend, i.e. the share of the points for the favorites is increasing over 
time.    
 
                                                          
1  See http://www.eurovision.tv/page/news?id=eurovision_song_contest_receives_prestig
 ious_charlemagne_medal 
2  Original: ,,Das ist auch dieses Mal das Problem gewesen. Es gab eine Reihe von Favoriten, die 
haben auch wirklich alle Stimmen abgesahnt und deswegen blieb für die zweite Hälfte des Tab-
leaus, für die zweite Hälfte der 13-27 nichts übrig und deswegen sitzen wir nun da unten. Die 
Verteilung war einfach anders“ (http://www.ardmediathek.de/tv/Eurovision-Song-Contest-
2015/Peter-Urban-Man-kann-Ann-Sophie-nichts/Das-Erste/Video?documentId=28484804&bcas-
tId=9525092; 19.10.2015). 
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However, does the claimed increasing concentration on the top performers actually 
take place? In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the development of the 
concentration of points allocated to the top performers. We employ a set of different 
indicators for measuring concentrations, namely simple concentration ratios, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI), and the Gini Coefficient. Furthermore, economet-
ric techniques are used to detect concentration trends in the voting data of the Eu-
rovision Song Contest. However, our analysis cannot support the hypothesis of cul-
tural preferences homogenization: the employed indicators and methods do not re-
veal a significant pro-concentration trend in the market of the contest. On the con-
trary, the majority of the employed indicators and methods indicate significant de-
concentration trends in the market of the contest. In general, the magnitude and 
level of concentration is very low.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section reviews earlier studies in the lit-
erature focusing on the topic of convergence and homogenization of cultural pref-
erences. Section three and four form the main part, containing descriptive analysis 
of points allocation, the different indicators for measuring concentration, the econ-
ometric analysis and its empirical results. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
our results in section five.   
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Previous Research on Cultural Convergence 
While Muska et al. (2014) and Drew (2012) deal with homogenizing trends on pref-
erences and cultural convergence in the field of the tourism industry and interna-
tional tourism marketing respectively, López et al. (2008) argue from a theoretical 
point of view about the role of the internet, that may support and provide a process 
of cultural convergence among countries.  
 
There are only very few empirical studies on convergence and homogenization in 
media and cultural economics so far. George and Peukert (2014) and Ferreira and 
Waldfogel (2013) are thematically closely related. They study the topic of whether 
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trade and current technology replace local culture and local music. George and 
Peukert (2014) deal with the question whether the lower costs of exchanging cultural 
goods lead to a homogenization trend of demand in the market for music. If there 
is a convergence trend in music, same international music-hits should take the same 
leading chart positions across the countries. George and Peukert (2014) put their 
empirical research on the role of the video-sharing website YouTube, which was es-
tablished in 2005. In order to prove, they investigate the change of weekly matches 
of the number of songs and artists on the market for popular music across Germany, 
Austria and the US from 2002 until 2013 by also focusing on the Youtube ban in 
2009 (videos were blocked by a contract dispute only in Germany). Generally, they 
find that the presence of YouTube increases the number of US hits on the single 
charts in Europe, which may be interpreted as pointing towards more convergence. 
Furthermore, their data displays an increase of the speed of the hit cycle in the 
YouTube age. However, George and Peukert (2014) conclude, despite the introduc-
tion of YouTube, there is still a high demand for domestic music. They stress the fact 
that “although we find that the net impact of the YouTube platform is to widen the 
reach of international hits, the magnitude of estimated effects are modest, suggest-
ing that YouTube will not drive out the market for local artists” (George and Peukert 
2014: 19).  
 
Likewise, Ferreira and Waldfogel (2013) focus their study on the convergence of 
tastes for worldwide hits in the market for music. They use a unique dataset on music 
charts that corresponds over 98 % of the global market for popular music in order 
to offer details about the demand of global music and their trade since 1960 until 
2007. Their collected 1,202,554 chart entries that cover 68,283 songs and a number 
of 23,377 artists from 22 countries. Inter alia, they could not find a connection be-
tween the growth of communication channels (MTV and Internet) and the simulta-
neous decrease of domestic music consumption. They also find, against the presump-
tion of US dominance in the world entertainment industry, that music trade is ap-
proximately proportional to countries’ GDPs and that even smaller countries have a 
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larger proportional share of trade than the US. Their “(…) findings suggest that con-
cern about cultural domination by large economies – particularly the US – is mis-
placed for music” (Ferreira and Waldfogel 2013: 30). 
 
Our paper adds to the literature by analyzing a live music event where audience in 
dozens of countries watches the same performances and vote for their favorite per-
formances. Furthermore, the participating countries predominantly come from Eu-
rope, so that the process of cultural convergence should be particularly strong due 
to (relatively) close geographic proximity. Thus, it is interesting to analyze whether 
this unique setting yields the convergence trends that the literature struggles to iden-
tify in broader contexts. 
 
2.2 The Eurovision Song Contest 
We choose the annual Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) as relevant example for testing 
our hypothesis, because music is said to be the most probable potential source of 
(cultural) convergence (Cheng et al. 2008). Furthermore, the whole historical voting 
data of the ESC is available, it covers the period in time where digitalization and 
internet availability were invented and it always takes place at the same time once a 
year (in spring).  
 
Nowadays, the ESC is one of the most successful and longest-living international 
music competitions and television shows worldwide. At the same time, it is the 
world’s largest entertainment broadcast with around 200 million international view-
ers. The main aim of this contest is to “promote high-quality original songs in the 
field of popular music, by encouraging competition among artists, songwriters and 
composers through the international comparison of their songs” (EBU/UER 2013). In 
the end of the contest, populations of the participating countries (in fluctuating com-
binations of expert juries and audience voting) vote for the performances that each 
participating country represent, however, they must not vote for their own country. 
In 2015, the Eurovision Song Contest has been awarded a Guinness World Record 
for the “World’s Longest Running Annual TV Music Competition”, because it has as 
8 
 
the only television show successfully bringing nations together for a remarkable pe-
riod of 6 decades3. Additionally, one year later (2016) it has also been awarded the 
“The Charlemagne Medal for European Media” (médaille charlemagne pour les mé-
dias européens), which is a European media award. It honors personalities or insti-
tutions within the field of the media that have supported the development of Euro-
pean unity and a creation of a European identity in a special way.4  
 
The first Song Contest (former Grand Prix Eurovision) took place in Lugano on the 
24th of May, 1956. However, initially only seven nations participated.5 All active 
Members (56 countries) of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) are invited to 
take part in the ESC. Although membership is not restricted to European countries, 
for instance, Morocco, Israel and Australia participated in the contest in the past. 
Still, its geographical reach predominantly covers Europe. However, due to geo-
graphical proximity and supporting factors like an advanced economic integration, 
the contest offers a particularly striking example: if homogenization trends occur, 
they should be visible in the ESC.  
 
In the past years, the details of the voting system were frequently modified. The 
current system of scoring, the so called “douze points”-voting-system, was intro-
duced in 1975 and is based upon every country creating its own ranking of the top 
10 performances. The participant who obtains the highest number of votes within a 
country, receives twelve points, the second place will be rewarded with ten and the 
third place with eight points. The performers of the seven following ranks receive 
decreasingly seven to one point. Nine and eleven points are not awarded. Expectedly, 
the winner of the contest is finally the country having received the highest total num-
ber of points. After qualification through semi-final systems and other criteria, a max-
imum of 266 countries participate in the final contest. In the end, all participating 
countries vote in the final, but only participants performing in the final receive votes. 
Because of this modification, the total number of countries that are allowed to vote 
                                                          
3  See http://www.ebu.ch/news/2016/04/eurovision-song-contest-receives#sthash.SDzJeIBs.dpuf. 
4  See http://www.ebu.ch/news/2016/04/eurovision-song-contest-receives. 
5  For comparison, there were 42 participating countries in Stockholm in 2016. 
6  Except for 2015 when 27 countries competed in the final. 
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increases from 24 in 2003 to, for example, 36 in 2004 and an amount of 43 voting 
countries in 2008, while 25 countries participated in the final of the contest. Moreo-
ver, with the introduction of a televoting system from 1997/1998 onwards, not only 
a jury of experts decided upon the final results and ranks of the participating coun-
tries but also audiences in public were allowed to vote for their preferred songs. After 
some delicate adjustments, the final points allocation of each country is currently 
compiled half-and-half by votes of the audience and a jury of experts. In case of a 
draw, audience votes have priority over the jury votes.  
 
The ESC has been subject to empirical analysis in media and cultural economics. Var-
ious researchers have focused their study on voting patterns and collusive voting 
behavior in this song contest. These papers establish empirical evidence for (cultur-
ally) biased voting behaviors, which are based on geographical closeness, political 
relations, and linguistic, religious, and ethnical factors. These variables are allegedly 
caused by the audience and jury influence in the voting process with the most recent 
and most elaborate publications being by Fenn et al. (2006), Ginsburgh and Noury 
(2008), Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009) as well as Budzinski and Pannicke (2016).7 
However, to our best knowledge, none of the papers has dealt with concentration 
trends. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In our paper, we perform an empirical study, comparing different indicators meas-
uring concentration trends in points allocation in the Eurovision Song Contest. There-
fore, we gather the historical voting data set of the ESC from 1975-2016.8 An official 
committee publishes the voting outcomes each year. The results of the voting illus-
trate the total number of points each partaking country received in the contest. We 
collect the years 1975-2016 (inclusive) for our data analysis because there were no 
changes of the “douze points”-voting-system since its introduction in 1975. In total, 
                                                          
7  Other relevant papers include, inter alia, Haan et al. (2005), Clerides and Stengos (2006), Yair 
(1995). 
8  See http://www.eurovision.tv. 
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954 times countries received points throughout the investigated period. All partici-
pating countries who received points throughout our sample are listed in Table 1. 
Here you can find the number of times each country participated (Year), the points’ 
standard deviation, the mean points awarded per country over all partaking years as 
well as their minimum and maximum points in total of a year. Austria, for example, 
receives around 50 points on average over a period of 31 years. Denmark likewise 
participated 31 times but with higher points on average, more precisely with points 
of 75 on average. Denmark received at minimum 5 points in a contest, their maxi-
mum number of receiving points were 281. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Participating countries Year mean points  
awarded 
(sd) points  
Awarded 
(min) points  
Awarded 
(max) points  
awarded  
Albania 7 72 39.58535 34 146 
Armenia 9 133 70.30647 34 249 
Australia 2 353.5 222.7386 196 511 
Austria 31 49.83871 57.40157 0 290 
Azerbaijan 9 143.1111 70.92856 33 234 
Belarus 4 63.5 55.89574 18 145 
Belgium 31 60.19355 62.39574 2 217 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 18 69 54.3637 13 229 
Bulgaria 2 232 106.066 157 307 
Croatia 17 64 34.63741 24 131 
Cyprus 27 51.59259 37.85322 2 170 
Czech Republic 1 41 . 41 41 
Denmark 31 74.83871 63.4524 5 281 
Estonia 14 81.64286 53.73812 2 198 
Finland 31 38.22581 52.20709 0 292 
France 41 69.60976 55.32218 2 257 
Georgia 7 90.14.286 31.44004 50 136 
Germany 41 65.58537 53.7308 0 246 
Greece 35 78.08571 64.37453 10 252 
Hungary 12 68.25 51.36876 3 143 
Iceland 24 54.75 48.89407 0 218 
Ireland 34 86.55882 58.01577 5 226 
Israel 31 76.19.355 49.71748 4 172 
Italy 23 93.78261 59.54292 27 292 
Latvia 10 97.1 67.9893 5 186 
Lithuania 12 54.41667 62.97107 0 200 
Luxembourg 19 49.21053 38.88527 4 142 
Macedonia 8 46.125 21.11491 16 73 
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4. Concentration in the Voting Market of the ESC 
4.1 Concentration Ratios, HHI and Gini Coefficient 
In case of a homogenizing trend on preferences and culture convergence, the con-
test´s point allocations should have become more concentrated on the leading art-
ists over the investigated period. Conversely, that means regional differences should 
have become less concentrated over time. In order to measure and compare the dif-
ferent points allocations from the beginning of the “douze points” system in 1975 
until 2016, we work with three different measures.  
 
First, we calculate the concentration ratio, which is usually used in economics to 
measure the concentration of market shares in a distinct market. If a market or an 
industry is dominated by a small number of large firms, the value of the concentra-
tion ratio is high, which means stronger concentration power and (more often than 
not) less competition, and vice versa. The concentration ratio is calculated by the sum 
Malta 22 79.22727 54.27262 1 192 
Moldova 8 78 41.57266 22 148 
Monaco 5 66 45.17189 12 107 
Montenegro 2 40.5 49.49747 37 44 
Morocco 1 7 . 7 7 
Netherlands 29 66.55172 53.29338 4 238 
Norway 38 66.73684 74.86048 0 387 
Poland 13 57.30769 67.78936 10 229 
Portugal 30 32.7 25.13707 0 92 
Romania 17 69.88235 50.99495 6 172 
Russia 20 147.8 1.194.834 17 491 
San Marino 1 14 . 14 14 
Serbia 7 138.1429 79.66477 53 268 
Serbia and Montenegro 2 200 89.09545 137 263 
Slovakia 3 14 5.567764 8 19 
Slovenia 13 42.76923 30.57001 7 96 
Spain 42 53.66667 34.32958 0 119 
Sweden 40 100.875 8.565.949 2 372 
Switzerland 29 61.86207 45.4224 0 148 
Turkey 33 60.48485 60.30502 0 195 
Ukraine 13 170.6923 135.785 30 534 
United Kingdom 42 78.16667 55.46298 0 227 
Yugoslavia 13 56.15385 44.02622 1 137 
Total 42 7.240.881 6.578.987 0 534 
12 
 
of the market shares of the largest n firms in the market. In our study, we employ 
this indicator in order to measure the “market share” of the top n performers in the 
“market for votes”, expressed by the points allocation “market for points”. We meas-
ure the share of points (= market share) won by the top 3 (CR-3), top 5 (CR-5), and 
top 10 (CR-10) participating countries for each year of the contest. If there is a trend 
of homogenization and a pro-concentration effect, the accumulated share of the top 
three-, five- and ten-placed countries should increase, i.e. the top three-, five- and 
ten-placed of later years score continuously more points compared to those top 
three, five and ten-placed of earlier years. For example, for calculating the CR-5 con-
centration ratio, we sum the percentage of points share owned by the top 5 partici-
pating countries with the highest number of points, where P1 is the country with the 
highest amount of points (the winner of the contest), P2 the second-placed, P3 the 
third-placed and so forth. M is the total number of all distributed points within a 
contest in year t. 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶t = P1+P2+P3+ … PxM  (1) 
 
A significant rise of concentration ratios indicates an increase of preference homog-
enization. Since concentration ratios do not take into consideration all market shares 
of firms (or in our case: participants) in a particular market, they may represent a 
biased picture of concentration. Furthermore and due to the fact that the value of 
the CR may also be biased as the number of participating countries in the final in-
crease, we additionally calculate HHI for measuring concentration. 
 
Thus, we secondly calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI; named after econ-
omists Orris C. Herfindahl 1950 and Albert O. Hirschman 1945, 1964) for each year, 
which focuses on all firms in an industry and therefore captures imbalances and var-
iations within all firms in a particular market. Because of its main advantage, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index is a widespread accepted measurement of market con-
centration in industrial economics and competition law (inter alia Borenstein 1989, 
Evans & Kesides 1993, Gilbert 1984, Sulivan 1985; Sumner 1981). It measures the 
sum of squared market share of all firms competing in that particular market. The 
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value of the HHI ranges from zero to 10,000. The higher the value of the HHI, the 
higher is market concentration. In antitrust economics, HHI values above 2500 imply 
highly concentrated markets. Moderately concentrated markets are characterized 
through values between 1500 and 2500.9 We convert the HHI into an indicator of 
preference homogenization for the ESC by looking at each country’s share of points 
of each contest since 1975. Thus, the index measures the sum of the quadratic share 
of points won by each country in a contest in year t. Consequently, we calculate the 
HHI as: 
∑
=
=
N
i
it MSHHI
1
2
       (2), 
 
where MSi is the market share of country i in year t and N is the number of partici-
pating countries receiving points in the contest. A significant rise of HHI indicates an 
increase of preference homogenization and therefore a decline in heterogeneity of 
demand across countries. Note that we are only interested in the change of the HHI 
from year to year. We do not interpret the level of the HHI (like in antitrust econom-
ics).  
 
A third concentration measure is the so-called Gini-coefficient, developed by Corrado 
Gini. It is mostly known in economics for its application for measuring income or 
wealth distribution (inter alia, Lambert 1993). However, it is also used for other pur-
poses, for instance, Schmidt and Berri (2001) use Gini-coefficients to measure com-
petitive balance in sports leagues. We adapt the indicator for measuring the homog-
enization trend in the ESC. As a measure of statistical distribution, the Gini-coeffi-
cient is used to point out inequalities. Consequently, values between one and zero 
are determined. In general, the values are expressed as percentages. The closer the 
calculated value is to zero, the more balanced and equal is the distribution of the 
points among all countries. A higher Gini-coefficient indicates that the votes concen-
trate on just a few participating countries. Values closer to one suggest a contest 
                                                          
9  For instance, these classifications are used by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice. See https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index 
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with a few countries that spread most of the points. Thus, high values signal market 
concentration and a decline in heterogeneity across countries 
We define the Gini-coefficient as: 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 =  2 ∑ 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑗𝑗−(1+n)∑ 𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑗𝑗  n∑ 𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑗𝑗  (3), 
 
where n represents the number of evaluated countries in year t and xj  the total num-
ber of points per country in year t.  
 
When applying these concentration measures, we have to consider that they may be 
biased to the changing number of participants in the Eurovision Song Contest. Ap-
pendix table 1 shows that the numbers vary between 19 and 27 with a (non-mono-
tonic) trend towards more participants in the ESC final in the course of time. Thus, 
the voters allocate their votes (and thus the points) in tendency among more candi-
dates. Ceteris paribus, this may drive down concentration, i.e. of the CRs. The HHI 
should be less sensitive because of its emphasis on the higher shares. In order to get 
an indication whether this problem is relevant for our analysis, we tested for statis-
tical correlations in order to see if there is a relationship between the changings of 
participating countries in the final and the changings of our measures from one year 
to another. We could not find any significant correlations between the difference of 
the number of participating countries (∆Part.) and the ones of the applied indicators 
∆HHI, ∆CR3, ∆CR5 and ∆CR10. Only ∆Gini-coefficient is significantly correlated to the 
difference of the number of participants on a significance level of 0.05 (5%)  (see 
appendix tables 2 and 3). However, Gini shows an increasing concentration with the 
increase in participation. Altogether, we derive confidence that the increasing num-
ber of participants does not counterbalance a possible pro-concentration effect. 
 
4.2  Concentration Trends in the ESC? 
Figure 1 shows the results of the Concentrations Ratios measured by the market 
share of the top 3, 5 and 10 countries in each contest during the entire sample pe-
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riod. In 2001, 57% of the distributed points were concentrated on the Top 5 partici-
pating countries. The concentration ratios settle at an average of 33.1% (CR-3), 48.9 
% (CR-5) and 76.3 % (CR-10). In general no pro-concentration trend is visible. In-
stead, continuous fluctuations occur. CR-3 and CR-5 reach all-time peaks in 2015 
(with value of 41 and 59 per cent, respectively), whereas CR-10 displays its fourth 
highest all-time value (83 per cent). However, it rather looks like an exception and 
not like a longer-run trend. No midterm or long-term pro-concentration trend is no-
table. The simple, descriptive application of the concentration ratios does not sup-
port the homogenization hypothesis. 
 
Figure 1: Concentration Ratios (CR-3, CR-5, CR-10) of the ESC points allocation 
from 1975-2016 
 
 
Figure 2 summarizes and illustrates the HHI for each year. The HHI is constantly below 
a value of 1500, which means that the distribution of the points is generally not 
highly concentrated. The HHI varies around a mean value of 724.8. The lowest HHI 
value is dated in 2011, which was 493. The highest HHI, which means the strongest 
concentration in our sample, was in 2015 with a value of 889. Again, while 2015 
indeed represents a year of high points concentration towards the top performers, 
no general trend towards more concentration can be identified. If at all, the trend 
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points in the direction of lower concentration and therefore an increase of hetero-
geneity of demand across countries – with 2015 perhaps representing an outlier. 
Accordingly, the market share of the top countries receiving points has seemingly 
not increased.  
 
Figure 2: HHI of the ESC points allocation from 1975-2016 
 
 
We can see the same picture with the Gini-coefficient (figure 3). In general, it appears 
to fluctuate up and down year by year. This implies that a year where points are more 
equally allocated is often followed by a year where points of the participating coun-
tries showing a pro-concentration effect. And again, 2015 indeed represents the year 
with an all-time concentration high of approximately 0.59. Still, the all-time low is 
only four years ago in 2011 (0.27).  
 
Figure 3: Gini-Coefficient of the ESC points allocation from 1975-2016 
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From looking at the standard concentration measures in economics, we cannot sup-
port the hypothesis of a longer-run or midterm pro-concentration trend in the ESC 
market of points. The development is rather characterized by continuous fluctuations 
with some years displaying a stronger concentration of votes across Europe towards 
the top and others the opposite. However, the year 2015 indeed appears to be a year 
with an exceptionally high concentration of votes on the top performers. 
 
4.3 Econometrics – Methods and Results 
To formally test whether a linear trend occurs, we run a set of time series regression 
with a time trend as the independent variable. Accordingly, we define 𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 as the de-
pendent variable (1): 
𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = α0i  + β1i · t + εti (4), 
 
where 𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  represents the concentration ratio (CR3, CR5 and CR10), HHI and Gini-Co-
efficient, β1i  t the independent variable time (measured in years) and εt,i the corre-
sponding error term. 
 
In order to see whether a trend exists, a time series regression model was estimated. 
The following figures show the results of running a regression of CR, HHI and Gini-
Coefficient against time with an assumed linear trend. In general, the results from 
our linear trend model do not confirm the results by George and Peukert (2014) to 
the extent that a homogenization trend of preferences can be show significantly. 
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Figure 4: Linear Regression Trendline Using Least Squares – CR, 1975-2016 
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nificant negative trendline on a one-star level, while CR-10 decrease significantly on 
a three-star level (see table 2). Therefore, we cannot find a pro-concentration effect. 
On the contrary, the employment of concentration ratios suggests a trend towards 
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Figure 5: Linear Regression Trendline Using Least Square – HHI, 1975-2016 
 
 
When looking at the trendline of the HHI, we find a linear function with a negative 
slope (figure 5). This equation shows that during the sample period, the HHI of voting 
significantly decreases by an average of 3.54 per year. Again, the hypothesis of a 
homogenization trend is rejected. In contrast, a significant deconcentration is de-
rived. 
 
Figure 6: Linear Regression Trendline Using Least Square – Gini, 1975-2016. 
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Table 2: Regression of HHI, CR-3, CR-5, CR-10 and Gini Coefficient against time 
(year) with a linear trend 
 HHI      CR3 CR5 CR10 Gini-Index 
Year -3.741***                 
(0.945) 
-0.0693                   
(0.0468) 
-0.148*                  
(0.0611) 
-0.288*** 
(0.0564) 
0.00112                 
(0.000781) 
_cons 802.1***                 
(23.31) 
34.57***                
(1.155) 
51.95***               
(1.508) 
82.24*** 
(1.391) 
0.400***               
(0.0193) 
N 
R-sq. 
Adj. R-sq 
42 
0.2818 
0.2297 
42 
0.0521 
0.028 
42 
0.1286 
0.107   
42 
0.3947 
0.380 
42 
0.0491 
0.025 
t statistics in parentheses;* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
4.4 Comparison of Concentration Trends before and after the introduction of 
 Televoting in 1998 
The ESC consists of two different groups of voters: (i) music experts and music in-
dustry representatives form national juries, and (ii) the television audience votes di-
rectly via various telecommunication channels. During the years, the voting system 
and the weight of the votes between those two groups has changed. In the literature 
on ESC voting behavior, there is indication that juries and the audience differ in their 
voting behavior with respect to voting biases (inter alia, Haan et al. 2005; Clerides 
and Stengos 2006; Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009). Although it has not been analyzed 
so far, expert juries and audiences may also be affected by cultural convergence to 
different degrees and extents. Notwithstanding, it is implausible to claim that one of 
the two groups – expert juries and audience – is not subject to the forces of cultural 
convergence at all. Still, if the influence differs in extent, our analysis may underesti-
mate a possible homogenization trend when using the different indicators without 
looking separately at different voting regimes. From 1975 until 1997, there was no 
audience voting and all points were allocated by expert juries, whereas from 1998 
until 2016 either both juries and audience voted (with equal weight) or only televot-
ing determined the points allocation (the latter in only few years from 1998 to 2008). 
Consequently, we separated our dataset into two samples in order to detect differ-
ences due to the major regime change. 
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Table 3: Comparison of the averages of HHI, concentration ratios and Gini-Co-
efficient before (1975-1997) and after the introduction of the televoting system 
(1998-2016) 
Year HHI Index CR 3 CR 5 CR 10 Gini-Coeff. Participants Points 
1975-1997 748,85462 33,378235 49,63866 78,13100 0,40913043 20,913044 1215,478 
1998-2016 688,641493 32,717530 47,695795 73,53244 0,44157895 24,842105 2164,316 
 
Looking at the concentration ratios (figure 7 and 8), there seem to be very little dif-
ferences between the two regimes. In other words, the introduction of audience vot-
ing did not speed up a convergence process. Predominantly, the oscillations seem to 
have increased with audience voting. 
 
Figure 7: Linear Regression Trendline Using Least Squares – CR, 1975-1997 
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Figure 8: Linear Regression Trendline Using Least Squares – CR, 1998-2016 
 
 
Figure 9: Linear Regression Trendline Using Least Square – HHI, 1975-1997 
 
 
Figure 10: Linear Regression Trendline Using Least Square – HHI, 1998-2016 
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Employing the HHI again shows very little differences. Quite in contrast to the con-
vergence hypothesis, the concentration appears to be decreasing with the introduc-
tion of the audience voting. This may indicate the audience is less prone to cultural 
convergence than expert juries. Again, fluctuations increase after the introduction of 
audience voting.  
 
Figure 11: Linear Regression Trendline Using Least Square – Gini, 1975-1997 
 
 
Figure 12: Linear Regression Trendline Using Least Square – Gini, 1998-2016 
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the hypothesis of cultural convergence. However, the trend can only be seen when 
focusing the trendline of expert juries on a significance level of 0.05 (5%) (table 4). 
The trend of the Gini Coefficient seemingly reverses with the introduction of the au-
dience voting. This may show the audience is, again, less susceptible to a trend of a 
homogenization than expert juries. Nevertheless, this trend is not significant (table 
5), so we should be reluctant with interpretations. Furthermore, the regression model 
for the 1998-2016 period (table 5) suggests with respect to its sample size and its 
very low values of adjusted R2 (even a negative value in CR3) that its economic rele-
vance is restricted and the model is quite poor because it does not fit the data. The 
results may be improved with the increase of sample size, what is unfortunately not 
possible so far. Altogether, a convergence trend cannot be supported. 
 
Table 4: Regression of HHI, CR-3, CR-5, CR-10 and Gini Coefficient against time 
(year) with a linear trend, 1976-1997 
1975-1997 HHI    CR3    CR5    CR10    Gini-Coefficient   
Year  -6.534*** -0.219*   -0.323**  -0.442*** 0.00272*   
 (1.417) (0.0811)    (0.0983)    (0.0811)    (0.00125)    
_cons 827.3*** 36.00*** 53.51*** 83.43*** 0.377*** 
 (19.43)    -1.112 -1.348 -1.113 (0.0171)    
N 23 23 23 23 23 
R-sq. 0.5030 0.2573 0.3392 0.5853 0.1841 
adj. R-sq 0.479    0.222   0.308    0.566    0.145    
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 5: Regression of HHI, CR-3, CR-5, CR-10 and Gini Coefficient against time 
(year) with a linear trend, 1998-2016 
1998-2016 HHI    CR3    CR5    CR10    Gini-Coefficient   
Year  -5.820  -0.109    -0.289    -0.569*    -0.00511    
 (4.109)  (0.195) (0.261) (0.239) (0.00308) 
_cons 746.8*** 33.81*** 50.58*** 79.22*** 0.493*** 
 (46.85) (2.228)  (2.974)  (2.725) (0.0351)  
N 19 19 19 19 19 
R-sq. 01055 0.0179 0.0671 0.2499 0.1390 
adj. R-sq 0.053    -0.040   0.012    0206    0088    
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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5.  Discussion and Implications 
The combination of globalization, digitalization and the widespread availability of 
broadband internet is often believed to cause a convergence of tastes and prefer-
ences across countries and cultures, in particular regarding entertainment products 
(cultural convergence hypothesis). We contribute to the empirical analysis of this 
topic by analyzing voting data from the Eurovision Song Contest, a competition of 
popular music, where each country presents a song and expert juries and the audi-
ence from all countries vote for their favorite performances. According to the cultural 
convergence hypothesis, votes should concentrate in the course of time on the same 
hit performances, leading to an increased concentration of points on the side of top 
positions – in contrast to a rather even distribution of points among the participants. 
Both representatives of the ESC organizers and long-standing experts of the contest 
have expressed that according to their perception this convergence or concentration 
process takes place (see section 1). In order to review these assessments, we apply 
three different concentration measures – concentration ratios, the HHI, and the Gini 
coefficient – and test for significant time trends. 
 
Altogether, our empirical analysis of the points allocation development in the ESC 
during the last four decades does not support the hypothesis of preference conver-
gence. None of the employed measures displays a significant increase in the concen-
tration of points on the top positions. Only the Gini coefficient yields a positive sign, 
indicating an increase in concentration. However, it is not significant, in particular 
not for the time period after 1998. Consequently, we find no indication that the pop 
music tastes of the citizens of European countries converge in the course of time 
along with the ongoing process of digitalization and internationalization of (inter-
net-based) music platforms (video streaming, legal and illegal downloading, audio 
streaming, etc.). To that regard, the observation of ESC experts cannot be substanti-
ated by our empirical research. 
 
Quite in contrast to the convergence hypothesis, we find that some measures display 
a significant trend towards a deconcentration of the points allocation, i.e. towards a 
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heterogenization of tastes and preferences. CR5, CR10 and the HHI significantly de-
crease over time. However, we remain cautious about interpreting this trend. On the 
one hand, even though it is significant, it does not appear to be a strong trend taking 
place on a very deconcentrated level. On the other hand, the increasing number of 
participants in the contest may be the main driving-force for this deconcentration 
trend. Furthermore, if we isolate the period from 1998-2016 where audience voting 
influences the results, the econometric model does not display considerable explan-
atory power.  
Whereas we cannot support the convergence hypothesis, we do find support for the 
claim that 2015 was a year with a particular strong concentration of points on the 
top performers. All the measures we employed display the year 2015 as belonging 
to the top 3 most concentrated years in the history of the contest. However, this 
appears to be an outlier rather than a systematic effect. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Year Number of 
Partici-
pants 
Total Points HHI Index CR 3 in % CR 5 in % CR 10 in % Gini- 
Index 
1975 19 1102 817,059232 36,7513612 52,6315789 83,8475499 0,41 
1976 18 1044 888,272339 38,697318 55,0766284 86,1111111 0,42 
1977 18 1044 814,598288 36,0153257 54,0229885 82,4712644 0,38 
1978 20 1160 798,483948 34,5689655 51,2068966 81,637931 0,44 
1979 19 1102 723,745969 31,4882033 46,5517241 77,5862069 0,35 
1980 19 1102 787,332716 34,2105263 52,0871143 81,5789474 0,4 
1981 20 1160 759,185494 33,8793103 53,362069 77,5862069 0,39 
1982 18 1044 825,993453 34,2911877 51,6283525 83,2375479 0,39 
1983 20 1160 785,58264 34,8275862 53,7068966 80,1724138 0,39 
1984 19 1102 748,400038 35,2087114 50,7259528 76,0435572 0,34 
1985 19 1102 721,506187 30,0362976 47,5499093 78,6751361 0,35 
1986 20 1160 801,694411 37,3275862 52,3275862 79,4827586 0,42 
1987 22 1276 706,532955 32,6018809 46,3166144 74,9216301 0,41 
1988 21 1218 705,131835 29,9671593 44,5812808 76,1904762 0,39 
1989 22 1276 660,014642 29,6238245 45,846395 72,1786834 0,38 
1990 22 1276 715,622881 32,3667712 49,6081505 77,0376176 0,42 
1991 22 1276 778,367941 33,7774295 52,3510972 80,8777429 0,47 
1992 23 1334 670,796536 31,2593703 46,6266867 74,2128936 0,41 
1993 24 1450 727,419738 34,4137931 51,0344828 76,8275862 0,49 
1994 25 1450 750,002378 35,862069 50,9655172 75,5172414 0,49 
1995 23 1334 653,623713 27,5112444 41,4542729 72,2638681 0,4 
1996 23 1334 635,799042 28,185907 42,5787106 71,5892054 0,38 
1997 25 1450 748,489893 34,8275862 49,4482759 76,9655172 0,49 
1998 25 1450 790,192628 34,6896552 54,0689655 81,9310345 0,53 
1999 23 1334 725,270798 33,6581709 49,4752624 78,185907 0,53 
2000 24 1392 725,357957 34,9137931 48,8505747 76,2931034 0,46 
2001 23 1334 836,961579 39,1304348 57,2713643 79,910045 0,5 
2002 24 1392 676,546605 32,3994253 47,8448276 73,9942529 0,42 
2003 26 1508 692,188083 32,8912467 48,1432361 76,3925729 0,49 
2004 24 2088 822,04368 38,0747126 55,5555556 81,7528736 0,52 
2005 24 2262 589,100981 25,6410256 39,2130858 68,5234306 0,37 
2006 24 2204 757,021551 34,8911071 50,4083485 80,2177858 0,49 
2007 24 2436 607,10848 29,1461412 42,2824302 69,3349754 0,38 
2008 25 2494 609,568819 28,8692863 44,1459503 70,7698476 0,4 
2009 25 2436 681,970767 33,3333333 47,7011494 70,4433498 0,42 
2010 25 2262 571,382336 25,5526083 38,5499558 68,0813439 0,36 
2011 25 2494 493,29618 23,8572574 35,6054531 58,9013633 0,27 
2012 26 2436 671,02723 34,6880131 46,8390805 69,0065681 0,43 
2013 26 2262 681,118327 32,2281167 48,3642794 74,7126437 0,43 
2014 26 2146 675,519335 34,7623486 49,5340168 69,944082 0,44 
2015 27 2320 889,064358 41,3793103 59,1810345 82,6293103 0,59 
2016 26 4872 589,448671 31,5270936 43,1855501 66,091954 0,36 
Mean 22,6 1644,71429 721,615348 33,0793451 48,7597453 76,0507033 0,4238 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix of the sample   
 dPartic. dHHI dCR3 dCR5 dCR10 dGini 
       
dPartic. 1.000      
       
dHHI 0.0755 1.000     
 0.6388      
       
dCR3 0.1795 0.9149* 1.000    
 0.2615 0.0000     
       
dCR5 0.1781 0.9470* 0.9416* 1.000   
 0.2652 0.0000 0.0000    
       
dCR10 0.0534 0.9266* 0.7545* 0.8478* 1.000  
 0.7401 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
       
dGini 0.3331* 0.9097* 0.8470* 0.8846* 0.8866* 1.000 
 0.0333 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
 
 
Table 3: Regression-output of changes in HHI, CR-3, CR-5, CR-10 and Gini Coef-
ficient against changes of the number of participating countries in the final by 
OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ∆HHI ∆CR3 ∆CR5 ∆tDR10 ∆Gini 
∆Participants 7.017 0.789 1.012 0.291 0.0227* 
 (0.47) (1.14) (1.13) (0.33) (2.21) 
      
_cons -6.749 -0.262 -0.403 -0.483 -0.00510 
 (-0.40) (-0.33) (-0.40) (-0.49) (-0.44) 
N 41 41 41 41 41 
      
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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